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Abstract
With heterogeneity in both skills and discount factors, the Atkinson-Stiglitz the-
orem that savings should not be taxed does not hold. We consider a model with
heterogeneity of preferences at each earnings level. With some assumptions on the
equilibrium, a small savings tax on high earners and a small savings subsidy on low
earners both increase welfare, regardless of the correlation between ability and discount
factor. Key is that types who value future consumption less are more tempted to switch
to a lower paid job. Extending Saez (2002), a uniform savings tax increases welfare
if the correlation of skill with discount factor is su¢ ciently high. Some optimal tax
results and empirical evidence to support the assumptions are presented.
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1 Introduction
In the Mirrlees (1971) model, in the absence of bunching, all the workers at an earnings level
are identical. The same property holds in the two-period extension (with one period of work)
of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) to consider the taxation of capital income. This paper also
analyzes two-period models with one period of work, but with the population varying in two
dimensions - skill and preference for savings - resulting in heterogeneity in the population
at each earnings level. The goal is to explore the implications of this heterogeneity for the
welfare implications of introducing taxation of capital income, both uniformly and with rates
possibly varying with earnings level.
The Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem states that when the available tax tools include nonlin-
ear earnings taxes, optimal taxation is inconsistent with taxing savings when two key as-
sumptions are satised: (1) that all consumers have preferences that are separable between
consumption and labor and (2) that all consumers have the same sub-utility function of
consumption. The models analyzed in this paper allow for di¤erences in savings preferences
as well as di¤erences in ability. In the baseline model, these di¤erences in savings pref-
erences are introduced through di¤ering discount factors in the (additive) utility function.
The subutility functions of consumption thus vary in the population. The Atkinson-Stiglitz
theorem does not apply.
Primary attention is focused on a model with four worker types - with two discount factors
and two skill levels. Thus we are examining a particular example of a multidimensional
screening problem. With this heterogeneity, equilibrium in the standard labor market model,
where workers are free to choose hours, would generally exhibit four di¤erent earnings levels.
To explore the implications of heterogeneity at individual earnings levels, the model assumes
the existence of two jobs, rather than the standard model where each worker can select the
number of hours to be worked.1 This results in a setting where workers with the same skill
but di¤erent discount factors choose the same job and so have the same earnings subject to
the same earnings tax rate. We assume that at the optimum both high-skill types work at
the high-skill job and that redistribution from high earners to low earners is the important
redistribution. Given these assumptions social welfare increases with the introduction of a
tax on the savings of high earners and with the introduction of a subsidy on the savings of
low earners.
The relative frequencies of the four types in the population plays no role in the derivation
of this result, conditional on the assumed structure of the optimum. The case for taxing the
savings of high earners appears to be more robust than the case for subsidizing the savings
1A limited number of jobs was assumed in Diamond (2006).
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of low earners in some extensions. While the focus of the paper is the introduction of small
taxes, we also consider optimal taxes under stronger assumptions. Savings tax policies, like
a savers credit for low-income households, as enacted in the US in 2001, or an absolute cap
on tax-favored retirement savings, are in line with the nding that the savings tax should
be progressive in earnings.2
The key underlying assumption is that those preferring to save more are more willing to
work than those preferring to save less, conditional on skill (the disutility of work). This
means that an incentive compatibility (IC) constraint just binding on a high skill worker who
saves a little is not binding on a high skill worker who saves a lot. Earnings-dependent taxes
and subsidies on savings allow an increase in redistribution by targeting types in a given job
with saving preferences di¤erent from those of types who are just tempted to switch jobs.
In particular, introducing taxation of savings of high earners (and transferring the revenue
back equally to all high earners) eases the binding IC constraint since it transfers resources
from the high saver to the low saver for whom the IC constraint is binding. Introducing a
subsidy on savings for low earners (nanced by equal taxation on all low earners) also eases
the binding IC constraint by making switching to the lower job less attractive to the high
earner with low savings.
The assumption that those preferring to save more are more willing to work is implicit in a
standard model with heterogeneity in discounting, representing preferences over rst-period
consumption x, second-period consumption c and output z by u (x) + iu (c)  v (z=ni). An
alternative specication 1
i
u (x) + u (c)   v (z=ni) would imply the exact opposite. That is,
types with higher i would prefer to save more, but to work less. The relationship between
preferences for savings and willingness to work depends more generally on heterogeneity in
expected inheritances, medical expenditures, wealth, etc... The sign of the relationship is
su¢ cient in these models to determine the welfare e¤ect of introducing earnings-dependent
savings taxes, with discount rate di¤erences just one example.
We examine some empirical support for our assumption that the relationship is positive,
using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). We nd that conditional on ed-
ucation and age, people with higher savings preferences tend to earn more. To proxy for
savings, we use reported savings propensities and the time horizon people report having in
mind when making spending and savings decisions.
The main result is independent of whether those with higher ability are more likely to
have higher savings rates than those with lower ability, provided that the optimum has all
the high skilled workers on the more productive job. Introduction of a uniform savings tax,
2The analysis assumes rational savings by all workers. Concern about too little individual savings is also
relevant for retirement savings policies.
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however, only increases welfare if the correlation between ability and savings propensities is
positive and su¢ ciently high. Empirical evidence suggests that on average those with higher
skills do save at higher rates (Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes, 2004,3 Banks and Diamond, 20104).
We also use the proxies mentioned above to revisit the positive correlation between skills
and savings propensities.
The result on the uniform savings tax builds on the analysis in Saez (2002). He derives
conditions on endogenous variables to sign the e¤ect on social welfare of introducing a uni-
form commodity tax or a subsidy, when consumers have heterogeneous sub-utility functions
of consumption. With an optimal non-linear earnings tax, a small tax on savings increases
welfare if either the net marginal social value is negatively correlated with savings, condi-
tional on earnings, or on average those who choose to earn less save less than those who
choose to earn more, if restricted to the same earnings.
This paper is part of the literature on the optimal choice of the tax base and the joint
taxation of labor and capital incomes in particular. Banks and Diamond (2010) review the
literature on the inclusion of capital income in the tax base. Gordon (2004) and Gordon and
Kopczuk (2008) argue that capital income reveals information about earnings ability and
thus should be included in the tax base. Blomquist and Christiansen (2008) analyze how
people with di¤erent skills and di¤erent preferences for leisure who cannot be separated with
an income tax, may be separated with a commodity tax. The four-types model with hours
chosen by workers has been studied by Tenhunen and Tuomala (2008), which calculates a set
of examples, but explores the analytics only in two- and three-type models. They consider
both welfarist and paternalist objective functions. We relate the results in their calculated
examples to some of our results below. We focus on the four-types model since the result
in a two-types model, while striking, does not seem relevant for policy inferences.5 While
the focus of this paper is on capital taxation, the intuition generalizes to the taxation of
other commodities for which the preferences are heterogeneous, since this heterogeneity may
impact the labor choice as well (Kaplow, 2008a).
3While Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes nd that high earners save more, they state that a standard model with
only discount rate di¤erences can not explain both higher savings when working and higher savings when
retired (in a three-period model with two retirement periods). Our focus is just on the savings propensities
of workers. We agree that there are multiple factors a¤ecting savings heterogeneity, but think that di¤erent
discount factors with a positive correlation with skill is one of them.
4Beyond looking at empirical studies of savings and earnings, Banks and Diamond discuss the wide nding
in the cognitive psychology literature, typically using experimental designs, that higher ability individuals
are more patient.
5Kocherlakota (2005) analyzes a model with asymmetric information about stochastically evolving skills,
which is not present in this model. The mechanism design optimum has the inverse Euler condition as a dis-
couragement to savings. He shows that the inverse Euler condition can be implemented with a linear wealth
tax that is regressive in earnings when capital income is received. Werning (2009) shows that implementation
can be done with a nonlinear wealth tax that does not vary with earnings when income is received.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model with four types and two
jobs. Section 3 characterizes respectively the rst best and a restricted rst best, with no
taxation of savings and an equal job, equal payrestriction. Section 4 introduces incentive
compatibility constraints and characterizes the second best including the introduction of
earnings-varying savings tax rates. Optimal savings tax rates and some extensions of the
model are also considered. Section 5 considers a uniform savings tax, rather than one varying
with the level of earnings. For comparison, Section 6 reviews a two-types model. Section 7
discusses empirical support for the assumptions and Section 8 has concluding remarks.
2 Model
We consider a model with two periods. Agents consume in both periods, but work only in
the rst period. Preferences are assumed to be separable over time and between consumption
and work. Denoting rst period consumption by x, second period consumption by c, and
earnings by z, preferences satisfy
U(x; c; z) = u (x) + u (c)  v (z=n) ,
with u0 > 0; u00 < 0 and v0 > 0; v00 > 0. An agents ability n determines the disutility of
producing output z. An agents preference for future consumption depends on the discount
factor .
We consider heterogeneity in both ability n and preference for future consumption .
Although robust insights for optimal taxation have been derived in models with two types,
considering heterogeneity in two parameters in a model with two types implies perfect cor-
relation between the two parameters. The inference based on a simple two-types economy,
although simple, may therefore be misleading. In order to allow for imperfect correlation,
we consider a four-types model. We denote the four types by ll; lh; hl; hh with frequencies
fij and welfare-weights ij. The rst two types have low ability nl, but di¤er in discount
factors l and h, with h > l. The second two types have high ability nh, with nh > nl,
and also di¤er in discount factors l and h.
high discount
factor h
low discount
factor l
high ability nh hh hl
low ability nl lh ll
There are only two jobs in the economy, h and l. The output zi from job i is independent
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of the workers type, while the disutility of holding a job varies with ability. The low-ability
types can only hold the low job. The high-ability types can hold either job. We assume that
redistribution to the low-skilled types is su¢ ciently important and the type mix su¢ ciently
balanced that all high-skilled workers hold high-skilled jobs at the various optima analyzed.
This requires a restriction on the weights in the social welfare functions and the population
distribution, which we do not explore.
We begin with the rst best, which di¤ers from the usual treatment in that the output
produced on a job is the same for everyone holding the job. We assume a linear technology.
The rst best has the property that there is no marginal taxation of savings. Then we
consider a restricted rst best (the term rst bestrefers to a lack of incentive compatibility
constraints, the term restrictedmeans limited tax tools, but not limited by IC constraints)
with zero taxation of savings and the requirement that everyone holding a job receives the
same pay (no taxes based on identity, only on potential earnings). We calculate whether
social welfare can be improved by taxing or subsidizing savings.
We then turn to the second best, with taxes based on earnings, not potential earnings,
so that there is an incentive compatibility constraint. We assume a zero taxation of savings
restriction, thus preserving the condition of equal pay for equal work. Again we ask about
potential gains from taxing or subsidizing savings.
3 First Best
In the rst best, each worker is assigned to the matching job and the social welfare function
is maximized with respect to the type-specic consumption levels in the rst and second
periods and the job-specic output levels, subject to a resource constraint. With the welfare
weight of type ij of ij, the rst best solves:
Maximizex;c;z
P
fijij (u [xij] + ju [cij]  v [zi=ni])
subject to: E +
P
fij (xij +R
 1cij   zi)  0
(1)
Forming a Lagrangian with  the Lagrange multiplier for the resource constraint, we have
L =
X
i;j
fijij (u [xij] + ju [cij]  v [zi=ni])  
X
i;j
fij
 
xij +R
 1cij   zi

We dene the net marginal social value of rst period consumption for an individual of
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type ij as
gij  iju0 [xij]  .
Along the relevant portion of the social welfare optima, we have the following properties:
gij = 0 and u0 [xij] = jRu0 [cij] for all i; j, and
(filil + fihih)
v0 [zi=ni]
ni
= (fil + fih) = fililu
0 [xil] + fihihu
0 [xih] ,
for both the high-skilled and the low-skilled jobs. The net marginal social value of rst
period consumption for each type equals 0 and the saving of each type is undistorted. Given
that the required output for a given job is independent of an individuals type, the earnings
are marginally distorted upward for one discount-factor type and downward for the other
type, since u0 [xil] 6= u0 [xih], unless the welfare weights satisfy il = ih.6 The output is
undistorted on averagethough.
3.1 Restricted First Best: Equal Pay for Equal Work and No
Taxation of Savings
If the (after-tax) earnings on a job, yi, is restricted to be type-independent and savings can
not be taxed, there are further constraints, which we approach using the indirect utility-of-
consumption function, wj [y;R]. This function satises
wj [y;R]  maxu [x] + ju [c]
subject to: x+R 1c = y.
For later use, we note that
@wj
@y
= u0 [x]
@wj
@R
= R 2cu0 [x] = R 1 (y   x)u0 [x] = R 1sj [y;R]u0 [x]
6Below we use welfare weights to permit the assumption that at the optimum, lump sum redistribution
between workers with the same earnings but di¤erent discount rates would not be as important as redistrib-
ution to those with lower jobs (or even of zero importance in some results). This is similar to the approach
in Saez (1999) which examined optimal taxes to minimize aggregate deadweight burden, assuming no value
to lump sum redistributions at the optimum. In contrast, Weinzierl (2009) looks for formulations such
that there is no interest in redistribution at a laissez faire equilibrium. We think normative evaluations of
hypothetical alternatives are not as useful as normative evaluations of actual or optimized equilibria.
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where sj [y;R] is the savings function of someone with discount factor j.
We continue to assume that the welfare weights and population fractions are such that
all high skilled are on the more productive job at the optimum. The restricted rst best
solves the following problem,
Maximizey;z
P
fijij (wj [yi; R]  v [zi=ni])
subject to: E +
P
fij (yi   zi)  0
(2)
Forming a Lagrangian, we have
L =
X
i;j
fijij (wj [yi; R]  v [zi=ni])  
X
i;j
fij (yi   zi) .
The rst order conditions (FOC) areX
j
fijiju
0 [xij] = 
X
j
fijX
j
fijijv
0 [zi=ni] =ni = 
X
j
fij,
for i = h; l. Recalling the denition of the net marginal social utility, gij  iju0 [xij]   ,
the population-weighted values add to zero at each job,X
j
fijgij = 0 for i = h; l.
Thus, the welfare weights determine the direction of desired redistribution (given the equal
pay condition) between workers on each job. Also, in the absence of savings taxation,
u0 [xij] = jRu0 [cij] for all i; j.
The FOC for job outputs, zi, are the same as given above.
3.2 Restricted First Best with Small Earnings-Dependent Savings
Taxes
Given the observability of earnings, small linear taxes on savings (collected in the rst period)
could be set di¤erently for high and low earners. This can for instance be implemented by
the rules on retirement savings accounts, like the IRA and 401(k) in the US. The (local)
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desire to redistribute can be met by a small linear tax or subsidy on savings by workers on
a given job with the revenues returned equally to them by raising net-of-tax earnings on the
job.
Di¤erentiating the Lagrangian with respect to a savings tax rate  i on those with earnings
level yi, evaluated at a zero tax level:
@L
@ i
= 
 X
j
fij (yi   xij)
!
 
X
j
fijiju
0 [xij] (yi   xij) .
The impact of a savings tax on the Lagrangian is made up of two pieces: the impact on the
revenue constraint and the impact on utilities. Using the FOC with respect to yi, multiplied
by yi, the derivative can be written as:
@L
@ i
=
X
j
fij
 
iju
0 [xij]  

xij =
X
j
fijgijxij.
Recall that X
j
fijgij = 0 for i = h; l.
This implies that a tax on the savings by the two types on a given job increases welfare if
the savings of the one type towards which redistribution is desirable saves su¢ ciently little
compared to the other type.
The welfare weights imply the desired direction of redistribution within productivity
types and so the signs of gih and gil at each job i. With equal incomes and di¤erent discount
factors, we have
xih < xil
cih > cil
Thus, if rst period utilities get the same weights for both types, il = ih, gil < 0 < gih,
implying a desire to redistribute to the high saver. In contrast, if second period utilities get
the same weights for both types, ill = ihh, the signs are reversed, implying a desire to
redistribute to the low saver. If there is no desire to redistribute for high (low) skill types
we have hhu
0 [xhh] = hlu
0 [xhl] (lhu
0 [xlh] = llu
0 [xll]). In general, with uniform weights for
given discount factors, hi = li, we do not satisfy both conditions.
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4 Second Best
We draw a distinction between restricted rst-best analyses and second-best ones based on
the absence or presence of IC constraints involving taking a job with lower productivity
(the reverse having been ruled out by assumption). That is, the distinction depends on the
observability of productivity. The prime issue in second-best analyses is determining which
IC constraints are binding. We start with the further restriction, as above, that savings not
be taxed. With no taxation of savings and equal pay for equal work, the IC constraint of not
imitating the other discount rate type who is holding the same job does not bind. Similarly,
if a high productivity worker were to take the low productivity job, the person imitated
would be the one with the same discount factor. Imitation is a misnomer here since there
need not be such a worker for a high skill worker to optimize savings while taking a low skill
job given the assumed policy tools and information.
We add the critical assumption that earnings distribution issues are su¢ ciently important
that at the second-best optimum (with IC constraints) the net marginal social value of rst
period consumption gij  iju0 [xij]    is negative for both of the worker types holding
the high-skill job and positive for both of the types holding the low-skilled job. Without a
binding IC constraint, this condition could not hold at the optimum as noted above.
Assumption 1 The net marginal social values of rst period consumption satisfy
ghj < 0; glj > 0, for j = h; l.
4.1 Second best with No Taxation of Savings
We assume that the Pareto-weights and population fractions are such that all high-skilled
workers work at the high-skilled job and the desired level of redistribution to lower earners
is su¢ cient that at least one IC constraint is binding.
Maximizey;z
P
fijij (wj [yi; R]  v [zi=ni])
subject to: E +
P
fij (yi   zi)  0
wh [yh; R]  v [zh=nh]  wh [yl; R]  v [zl=nh]
wl [yh; R]  v [zh=nh]  wl [yl; R]  v [zl=nh] .
(3)
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Forming a Lagrangian with j the Lagrange multiplier for the corresponding IC constraint,
and assuming that at the optimum each worker is assigned to the matching job, we have
L =
X
i;j
fijij (wj [yi; R]  v [zi=ni])  
X
i;j
fij (yi   zi)
+
X
j
j (wj [yh; R]  v [zh=nh]  wj [yl; R] + v [zl=nh]) .
Since the rst-period consumption of type hj if switching to the low job equals the rst-
period consumption of type lj, the FOC with respect to earnings areX
j
fhjhju
0 [xhj] +
X
j
ju
0 [xhj]  
X
j
fhj = 0,X
j
fljlju
0 [xlj] 
X
j
ju
0 [xlj]  
X
j
flj = 0.
Given the denition of the net social utility gij  iju0 [xij]  , this impliesX
j
fhjghj =  
X
j
ju
0 [xhj] < 0;X
j
fljglj =
X
j
ju
0 [xlj] > 0.
The population-weighted values add to a positive expressionX
i;j
fijgij =
X
j
j (u
0 [xlj]  u0 [xhj]) > 0.
That is, transfers which would be worth doing without an IC constraint are restricted, raising
the social marginal utilities of consumption, on average, above the value of resources in the
hands of the government. Since the IC constraints are on the high skilled types, on average
more redistribution from the high earners to the low earners is desirable.
IC constraints Given the equal pay constraint, it follows that only one of the IC con-
straints is binding, and it is the one on the low discount factor type. To see this consider
the di¤erence in consumption utility from di¤erent incomes,
 [yh; yl; j; R]  wj [yh; R]  wj [yl; R] .
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This di¤erence in consumption utility is increasing in the discount factor,
@ [yh; yl; j; R]
@
= u [chj]  u [clj] > 0.
The di¤erence in labor disutility does not depend on the discount factor. Thus if the IC
constraint is binding on the low discount factor type, it is not binding on the high discount
factor type. The low discount factor type values earnings in the rst period less and is
therefore more tempted to switch to the less productive job.
4.2 Second Best with Small Earnings-Dependent Taxes on Savings
As above, the sign of the welfare impact of introducing a small linear savings tax or subsidy
depends on the welfare weights. Given observability of earnings, the small linear taxes on
savings could be di¤erent for high and low earners. The welfare impacts of introducing taxes
on savings (collected in the rst period) are obtained by di¤erentiating the Lagrangian (with
savings taxation included and the tax rates  i set at zero):
@L
@h
= 
 X
j
fhj (yh   xhj)
!
 
X
j
fhjhju
0 [xhj] (yh   xhj)  lu0 [xhl] (yh   xhl) ,
@L
@ l
= 
 X
j
flj (yl   xlj)
!
 
X
j
fljlju
0 [xlj] (yl   xlj) + lu0 [xll] (yl   xll) .
That is, the impact on the Lagrangian is made up of three pieces: the impact on the revenue
constraint, the impact on utilities, and the impact on the binding IC constraint.
The FOC for earnings are X
j
fhjghj + lu
0 [xhl] = 0,X
j
fljglj   lu0 [xll] = 0.
Multiplying these by the earnings level at the job, yi, and substituting, we have
@L
@h
=
X
j
fhjghjxhj + lu
0 [xhl]xhl,
@L
@ l
=
X
j
fljgljxlj   lu0 [xll]xll.
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Substituting for lu
0 [xil] from the FOC for earnings, we nd
@L
@h
= fhhghh (xhh   xhl) > 0
and
@L
@ l
= flhglh (xlh   xll) < 0.
The signs follow from the assumption on the net social marginal utilities and the di¤erences
in savings behavior by types ih and il for i = h; l. The correlation between skill and discount
plays no role in signing these expressions. The Proposition immediately follows.
Proposition 1 At the second best optimum, assuming that all high skill workers hold high
skill jobs and ghj < 0; glj > 0, for j = h; l, then introduction of a small linear tax on savings
that falls on high earners is welfare improving; and introduction of a small linear subsidy on
savings that falls on low earners is welfare improving.
At the second best optimum, without a tax on savings, only the high earner/low savers IC
constraint is binding. One can thus increase the redistribution from high earners/high savers
by taxing savings, but increasing net-of-tax earnings just enough that the high earners/low
savers remain indi¤erent to job change and thus the binding IC constraint is unchanged.
One can also increase the redistribution towards the low earners/high savers by subsidizing
their savings, but decreasing net-of-tax earnings such that the low earners/low savers remain
indi¤erent so that it does not become more attractive for the high earners/low savers to take
the low job.
4.3 Second Best with Optimal Linear Earnings-Dependent Taxes
on Savings
We have considered the introduction of small savings taxes on high and low earners. Part of
the interest in this analysis comes from the possible link to the signs of the optimal taxes.
Derivation of the FOC for the optimal linear savings taxes is straightforward; we show that
it matches the signs of the small improvements given the additional condition that workers
save more if the after-tax return to savings are higher.7
One di¤erence in analysis is that changes in both the earnings and savings taxes have a
rst order e¤ect on tax revenues through the behavioral change in savings. In rst period
units, the tax revenue from a linear savings tax  i levied on the savings of workers with
7Consideration of earnings-dependent nonlinear savings taxation would raise the issue of the degree of
complexity that is interesting for policy purposes.
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discount factor j and earnings yi equals  isj [yi; R (1   i)]. For notational convenience,
denote optimal savings sj [yi; R (1   i)] by sij. (Given preference separability, there is no
dependence on the e¤ort to achieve gross earnings.) A second di¤erence is that the relative
size of the utility loss of a marginal increase in the savings tax compared to the utility gain
of a marginal increase in earnings depends on the level of the savings tax. That is,
@wij
@ i
=  siju0 [cij] R =  sij
1   iu
0 [xij] =
 sij
1   i
@wij
@yi
.
Forming a Lagrangian, and assuming that at the optimum each worker is assigned to the
matching job, we now have
L =
X
i;j
fijij (wj [yi; (1   i)R]  v [zi=ni])  
X
i;j
fij f(yi   zi)   isij [yi; (1   i)R]g
+ l (wl [yh; (1  h)R]  v [zh=nh]  wl [yl; (1   l)R] + v [zl=nh]) .
The FOC for earnings are
X
j
fhjhju
0 [xhj] + lu
0 [xhl] 
X
j
fhj

1  h@shj
@y

= 0,
X
j
fljlju
0 [xlj]  lu0 [xll] 
X
j
flj

1   l@slj
@y

= 0.
The FOC for savings tax rates are
X
j
fhjhju
0 [xhj]
shj
1  h + lu
0 [xhl]
shl
1  h  
X
j
fhj

shj + h
@shj
@h

= 0,
X
j
fljlju
0 [xlj]
slj
1   l   lu
0 [xll]
sll
1   l  
X
j
flj

slj +  l
@slj
@ l

= 0.
Denote by Rh  R(1   h) and Rl  R (1   l) the after-tax returns to savings for
respectively the high and low skill types. Combining the rst order conditions as before, we
nd that the optimal linear savings tax is such that
fhhghh (xhh   xhl) = h
X
j
fhj

shj   @shj
@yh
shl +
@shj
@Rh
Rh

(4)
and
flhglh (xlh   xll) =  l
X
j
flj

slj   @slj
@yl
sll +
@slj
@Rl
Rl

. (5)
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The left-hand sides in equations (4) and (5) correspond to the welfare changes of introducing
earnings-dependent taxes on the high earners and low earners respectively. Thus, if the sum
of the terms in brackets on the right-hand side is positive, the optimal linear tax is positive
if the introduction of a small tax is welfare-improving and vice versa. Since preferences are
additive, @sij
@yi
< 1, and so sij   @sij@yi sil > 0 for i = h; l. Hence, a su¢ cient condition for
the right-hand side term to be positive is that savings are increasing in the after-tax return,
@sij
@Ri
 0.
Proposition 2 At the second best optimum, assuming that savings are increasing in the
after-tax returns, all high skill workers hold high skill jobs, and ghj < 0; glj > 0 for j = h; l,
the optimal linear savings tax is positive for the high earners and negative for the low earners.
4.4 MechanismDesign Optimum in Tenhunen and Tuomala (2008)
As noted above, Tenhunen and Tuomala (2008) consider two-, three- and four-types models
with hours chosen by workers. They derive the mechanism design optimal allocations as-
suming CES preferences with varying correlations between discount and skill, with implicit
marginal taxes shown in their Figure 1. For all but very high correlation, they nd that
savings are implicitly marginally taxed for the high skill worker with low discount factor,
savings are implicitly subsidized for the low skill worker with high discount factor, and there
are no other marginal savings distortions. With very high correlation, the low skill worker
with low discount factor is implicitly taxed, which also happens in the two-type model,
which has perfect correlation. The potential relevance of the pattern we nd is enhanced
by their ndings. In contrast with the optimal tax model analyzed here, the mechanism
design optimal allocation allows distortion of the savings of each type separately. As long as
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the correlation is not too high, on average the savings tax is positive for the high skill and
negative for the low skill types.
4.5 Robustness
We consider four extensions to highlight the extent of robustness of the propositions. First,
we allow di¤erent ability levels for the two high earner types. Second, we allow di¤erent
discount factors for all four types. Third, we show how the analysis extends to three skill
levels in workers and jobs, preserving the various assumptions. Finally, we show how the
propositions generalize when the heterogeneity in savings preferences comes from sources
di¤erent from the heterogeneity in discount factors.
Di¤erent Ability Levels of the High Earners In the four-types model above, we
assume that the two types with high skill have exactly the same skill. As long as the
high skill type with high discount factor has higher skill than the high skill type with low
discount factor, Proposition 1 continues to hold. However, if the type with low discount
factor is su¢ ciently more skilled, the type with high discount factor may be more tempted
to switch to the low earner job for which less output is required. For given skill of type hh,
nhh, this reversal of which IC constraint is binding holds when the ability level nhl of type hl
is higher than n^hl (> nhh), where the cut-o¤ level n^hl is such that the IC constraint is just
binding on both types,
fwl [yh; R]  v (zh=n^hl)g   fwl [yl; R]  v (zl=n^hl)g =
fwh [yh; R]  v (zh=nhh)g   fwh [yl; R]  v (zl=nhh)g .
With v [z=n] convex, the di¤erence in labor disutilities between jobs, fv (zl=n)  v (zh=n)g,
is decreasing in n. Hence, for values of nhl higher than n^hl the IC constraint is more stringent
for the high discount saver. In this case, a savings subsidy on the high earners and a savings
tax on the low earners are welfare improving. This is the opposite of Proposition 1. This
extension makes clear the importance of the distribution of workers across jobs, an issue we
plan to address in a setting with a continuum of skill levels.
Di¤erent Discount Factors among the High and Low Savers With job-specic
earnings and no taxation of savings, a high skill worker considering switching to the low job
chooses optimal savings without needing to match any particular worker holding the low
job. Thus, with the same skill among high earners, the gain from switching to the low job
is always higher for the high skill worker who has lower preference for savings, regardless of
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the discount rates among the low skill workers. We continue to have a welfare gain from
introducing taxation of savings among high earners as in Proposition 1.
Subsidization of savings of low earners will continue to generate a welfare gain as long
as the discount factor of the high-skill low-saver is small enough relative to the distribution
of discount factors among holders of the low skill job. Denoting by exhl the rst-period
consumption of the high-skilled low saver if taking the low skill job, the FOC for earnings
on that job is:
X
j
fljglj   lu0 [exhl] = 0.
The impact of a savings tax on low earners is
@L
@ l
=
X
j
fljgljxlj   lu0 [exhl] exhl.
Comparing the consumption in the IC constraint with a weighted average of consumptions
among low earners, this derivative is negative (and the gain from the subsidization of the
savings of low earners in Proposition 1 continues to hold) if and only if exhl > xl, where
xl =
P
j fljgljxljP
j fljglj
.
With the net marginal social values assumption, glj > 0, for j = h; l, xl is a proper weighted
average of the xlj. Since the discount rates for the marginal high skill type may well be too
high to meet this condition, we consider the tax of the savings of higher earners to be a more
robust policy conclusion than the subsidization of the savings of low earners.
We are exploring two extensions to the basic model, one with an education choice and
one with a continuum of worker types. In both cases, preliminary work suggests the same
pattern of greater robustness of the taxation of higher earners than of the subsidization of
lower earners.8
Three Ability Levels, Three Jobs We introduce an intermediate skill level in the model.
We extend the assumption that welfare weights and population fractions are such that at the
optimum all the high skilled are on the most productive job to also have all the intermediate
skilled on the intermediate job. We again consider the case in which agents may be tempted
8With heterogeneity in discount factors, people who discount the future less may choose to invest more
in education. If only education determines a workers skill level, high-skilled workers have higher discount
factors than low-skilled workers.
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to switch to jobs designed for less skilled people. Only two downward constraints are relevant
though.
First, as above, for two agents with the same skill, but di¤erent discount factors, the IC
constraint is slack for the type with the higher discount factor if it is binding for the type
with the lower discount factor. The reason is that, with
 [y1; y2; j; R]  wj [y1; R]  wj [y2; R] ,
both
@ [ym; yl; j; R]
@
> 0 and
@ [yh; yi; j; R]
@
> 0 for i = m; l.
Second, with v [z=n] convex, we have a similar condition for the di¤erence in the disutility
of labor between jobs. That is, with
0 [zh; zl; n]  v [zh=n]  v [zl=n] ,
@0 [zh; zl; n]
@n
= ( v0 [zh=n] zh + v0 [zl=n] zl) =n2 < 0.
Thus, for two agents with the same discount factor, the IC constraint of switching to the
low-skilled job is slack for the type with the highest ability if it is satised for the type with
the intermediate ability switching to the low-skilled job and for the type with highest ability
switching to the intermediate job. That is, the local IC constraints imply the global IC
constraint.
In a similar way as for the four-types model, we can set up the Lagrangian for the
constrained maximization problem. The two relevant IC constraints are
wl [yh; R]  v [zh=nh]  wl [ym; R]  v [zm=nh] ,
wl [ym; R]  v [zm=nm]  wl [yl; R]  v [zl=nm] .
The impact of the introduction of earnings-dependent savings taxes on the Lagrangian equals
respectively
@L
@h
= fhhghh (xhh   xhl) > 0,
@L
@m
= fmhgmh (xmh   xml) ? 0,
@L
@ l
= flhglh (xlh   xll) < 0.
This implies that Proposition 1 continues to hold for the high earners and the low earners.
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The following Proposition applies for the intermediate earners.
Proposition 3 In a model with three ability levels and three jobs, the introduction of a small
linear tax (subsidy) on savings that falls on the intermediate earners is welfare improving
if redistribution from (to) the intermediate earners to (from) general revenues is welfare
improving.
From Propositions 1 and 3, there is a single sign change as a function of earnings in the
response of welfare to taxing savings. This result generalizes for more than three jobs as
well, if the welfare weights are non-increasing in skill. The savings of workers with earnings
below a given level are subsidized, the savings of workers with earning above that level are
taxed. The result depends on the assumption that types with the same skill are all at the
same job, which becomes increasingly strained with many jobs.
A single sign change of the welfare impact of introducing a savings tax as a function of
earnings also holds for the optimal linear earnings-dependent savings taxes when workers have
CRRA preferences, u [x] = x
1 
1  , and  < 1. With logarithmic preferences, u [x] = log [x], the
optimal savings tax rate is strictly increasing in the earnings of workers if they are uniformly
distributed across jobs, fij = fj for 8i; j. Since for logarithmic preferences sij = @sij@yi yi and
@sij
@Ri
= 0, the optimal tax on the savings of earners at job i satises
fihgih (xih   xil) =  i
X
j
fij
@sij
@yi
xil.
With fij = fj for 8i; j and rst-period consumption xij = 11+j yi, we nd the following
expression for the optimal savings tax,
 i =
fh (l   h)P
j fj
j
1+j

ih
yi
  
1 + h

.
Since h > l, with the welfare weights non-increasing in skill, the optimal linear savings tax
is increasing in earnings,
@ i
@yi
> 0.
Di¤erences in Expected Payments We have introduced di¤erences in preferences for
savings by introducing heterogeneity in discount factors. Proposition 1 is driven by the fact
that workers who prefer to save more are also more willing to work for more pay. Hetero-
geneity in discount factors is not the only source of heterogeneity a¤ecting the relationship
between willingness to save and work. We explore one such source - an anticipated second
period expenditure.
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Consider a model where workers expect to make either a high payment eh or a low
payment el in the second period, with eh > el. Heterogeneity in future payments could come
from heterogeneity in expected medical or long term care expenditures (when e > 0), but
also heterogeneity in expected inheritances or other wealth transfer receipts (when e < 0).
As in the baseline model, we consider four types:
high future
payment eh
low future
payment el
high ability nh hh hl
low ability nl lh ll
With all workers having the same discount factor, the indirect utility-of-consumption for a
type who expects a future payment ej equals
wj [y;R]  maxu [x] + u [c  ej]
subject to: x+R 1c = y.
A type who expects a larger future payment (or a lower future transfer) saves more and thus
consumes less in the rst period, xih < xil.9 Moreover, the higher expected future payment
increases the marginal value of earnings and thus the willingness to work for more pay. The
di¤erence in consumption utility from di¤erent incomes,
 [yh; yl; ej; R]  wj [yh; R]  wj [yl; R] ,
is increasing in the expected payment e,
@ [yh; yl; ej; R]
@ej
=   (u0 [chj   ej]  u0 [clj   ej]) > 0.
This implies that at an optimum in which high-skill types are on the more productive job,
the IC constraint is binding only for the high-skill type who expects a low future payment
(or a large future transfer), who is the type who saves less. Hence, Proposition 1 holds with
heterogeneity in expected future transfers, while the opposite result holds with heterogeneity
in current wealth. This suggests that the progressivity in earnings of the savings tax may
be more desirable for younger workers than for older workers.
9Empirical evidence, however, shows that people with high expected inheritances may accumulate too
much wealth from a life-time perspective (Scholz, Seshadri and Khitatrakun 2006; Coe and Webb 2009)
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5 Second Best with Uniform Taxes on Savings
Proposition 1 leaves the natural question of what to do with a Nordic dual income tax where
the tax rate on savings is required to be the same for both earnings levels. Adding the
responses to the two separate tax changes, we have
@L
@
=
@L
@h
+
@L
@ l
= fhhghh (xhh   xhl) + flhglh (xlh   xll) .
In contrast with the earnings-varying tax on savings, the correlation between skill and dis-
count factor plays a role here.
If there is no desire to redistribute within a job, gih = gil, for i = h; l, then
fhhghh =
fhhP
j fhj
X
j
fhjghj =   fhhP
j fhj
lu
0 [xhl] ,
flhglh =
flhP
j flj
X
j
fljglj =
flhP
j flj
lu
0 [xll] .
Thus, the welfare impact of a change in the uniform tax on savings equals
@L
@
= l
 
fhhP
j fhj
u0 [xhl] (xhl   xhh)  flhP
j flj
u0 [xll] (xll   xlh)
!
.
It is convenient to write this as
@L
@
= l
flhP
j flj
u0 [xll] (xll   xlh)
 
fhh=
P
j fhj
flh=
P
j flj

  1
!
,
with

  u
0 [xhl] (xhl   xhh)
u0 [xll] (xll   xlh) > 0.
Since xll > xlh,
sign

@L
@

= sign
 
fhh=
P
j fhj
flh=
P
j flj

  1
!
:
The sign of this expression depends on the distribution of types and the ratio of the weights,

. That is, 
  1 is a su¢ cient condition for a positive correlation between aspects,
fhhP
j fhj
> flhP
j flj
, to imply that introducing a savings tax increases social welfare.
Assuming homothetic preferences, so that xhl
xll
= xhh
xlh
, the expression for 
 becomes
u0[xhl]xhl
u0[xll]xll
. This expression is equal to one for the log utility function. For CRRA prefer-
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ences, u [x] = x
1 
1  , we nd

 =

xhl
xll
1 
.
Thus, if the relative risk aversion  is smaller than 1, then 
  1 and a positive correlation
between ability and discount factor (i.e. fhhP
j fhj
> flhP
j flj
) implies that @L
@
is positive. If 
is larger than 1, the sign of @L
@
depends on the size of the correlation and the magnitude
of the earnings di¤erence between jobs. Conversely, when the correlation is negative, @L
@
is
negative if  is greater than 1.10 This implies the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If there is no desire to redistribute within a job, gih = gil, for i = h; l,
with CRRA preferences, a uniform small tax on savings increases welfare if the relative
risk aversion is smaller than one and the correlation between ability and discount factor is
positive. A uniform small subsidy on savings increases welfare if the relative risk aversion
is greater than one and the correlation between ability and discount factor is negative.
Corollary 1 If there is no desire to redistribute within a job, gih = gil, for i = h; l, with
logarithmic preferences, a uniform small tax (subsidy) on savings increases welfare if and
only if the correlation between ability and discount factor is positive (negative).
As with the earnings-varying taxes, the sign result for introducing a uniform tax matches
that for optimal linear taxation in some interesting cases. Denote by R  R(1 ) the after-
tax returns to savings and by sij the savings of type ij as a function of after-tax earnings
and the after-tax interest rate. Setting the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to 
equal to zero, we nd the following condition for the optimal linear tax,
fhhghh (xhh   xhl) + flhglh (xlh   xll) = 
X
i;j
fij

sij   @sij
@yi
sil +
@sij
@R
R

.
If the sum of the terms in brackets is positive, we have that the optimal uniform tax is
positive if the introduction of a small uniform tax is welfare improving. This is the case for
logarithmic preferences and CRRA preferences with relative risk aversion  < 1.
Proposition 5 If there is no desire to redistribute within a job, gih = gil, for i = h; l, with
logarithmic preferences or CRRA preferences with  < 1, the optimal linear uniform tax on
savings is positive if the correlation between ability and discount factor is positive.
10For CARA preferences, @L@ is negative when the correlation between ability and discount factor is
negative. When the correlation is positive, @L@ is positive if the absolute risk aversion is su¢ ciently small.
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6 Two Types
Using a model with two types of workers, a high-skilled worker with high discount factor and
a low-skilled worker with low discount factor, the empirical nding of a positive correlation
between skill and savings rates is treated as a perfect correlation. In this model, if there is
positive (negative) marginal earnings taxation then there is a gain from introducing positive
(negative) marginal savings taxation. The corollary is that introducing savings taxation on
the low earner is a gain if redistribution goes from the high earner to the low earner. The
full mechanism design optimum has the same property. The source of this inference does
not seem robust to realistic diversity in the economy. With two-dimensional heterogeneity,
there are low earners with both high and low savings rates. If a high earner can imitate the
savings of a low earner with the same savings propensities, a savings tax on the low earner
has the same impact on the low earner and the high earner imitating a low earner and so
does not help discourage the high earner from imitating. Thus to model less-than-perfect
correlation, we use the four-types model with high and low earners with both high and low
concern for the future. We report the results for two types here to mark the contrast with
the four types model. The proof parallels that of the same result for the mechanism design
optimum, which is in Diamond (2003).11 We consider the second-best Pareto frontier with
the types referred to as 1 and 2.
Proposition 6 In a two-types model without taxes on savings and with sign (1   2) =
sign (n1   n2), the introduction of a small linear tax (subsidy) on savings at a given earnings
level is welfare improving if and only if earnings at that level are marginally taxed (subsidized).
Corollary 2 In a two-types model without taxes on savings and with sign (1   2) = sign (n1   n2),
the introduction of a savings tax on the lower earner is welfare improving if redistribution
goes from the higher earner to the lower earner.
The proposition combines the properties of the mechanism design optima in the two
separate two-types models with heterogeneity in one dimension. When both types have the
same discount factor, but di¤erent abilities, the earnings of the potentially imitated type
are marginally taxed or subsidized if the ability of that type is lower or higher respectively
(Mirrlees, 1971). Similarly, when both types have the same ability, but di¤erent discount
factors, the savings of the potentially imitated type are marginally taxed or subsidized if
the discount factor for that type is lower or higher respectively. If both types have the
same discount factor, distorting savings does not help separate the two types (Atkinson and
11Golosov, Tsyvinski and Weinzierl (2009) consider a model with a continuum of types and perfect corre-
lation between ability and savings preference.
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Stiglitz, 1976). Similarly, if both types have the same ability, earnings are not subject to
marginal taxation.12 However, when the two types di¤er in both ability and discount factor,
both the marginal taxation (or subsidization) of earnings and the marginal taxation (or
subsidization) of savings is used to separate types.
7 Preferences and IC Constraints
Above we used the utility functions u [x] + ju [c]  v [z=nj]. This family of utility functions
has the property that those with higher savings rates (larger values of j) are more willing
to increase work for a given amount of additional pay. But that is not the only way in
which the savings and labor supply decisions can be connected in this simple setting. For
example, with the utility functions (u [x] + ju [c]) =j   v [z=nj] = u [x] =j + u [c]  v [z=nj],
the relationship is reversed - those with higher savings rates are less willing to increase work
for additional pay. If we had assumed this class of functions, then we would have reversed
the pattern of desirable savings taxes in Proposition 1 - having the IC constraint bind for
the high saver would imply that it is not binding for the low saver, implying, in turn, that
there should be a subsidy of savings for high earners and a tax on savings for low earners.
That it is standard practice to write utility in the form employed does not, by itself, shed
light on its empirical reality. More generally, a one-dimensional family of separable utility
functions, U [ [x; c; j] ; z; j], can have any pattern between the variation in the subutility
function of consumption and the variation in the interaction between consumption and labor.
In the example of a distribution of inheritances or medical expenses, the IC constraint that
is binding depends on the timing of the event - a future event ts with the proposition in
the text; early events reverse it. This raises the question of identifying an empirical basis for
distinguishing which case is more relevant.
It is not easy to nd data applying directly to this issue. The models we have examined
have two periods with one period of work. They can be thought of as modeling working life,
and then retirement. The question we want to answer is whether, for a given level of skill,
those with higher savings rates tend to have greater labor supply functions. While the model
has only two types at each skill and so a perfect correlation between these two characteristics,
presumably a more heterogeneous population and recognition of the stochastic nature of
employment opportunities would move the empirical test to one of correlation.
12This can be considered an implication of the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem, since there is separability and
everyone has the same subutility function over rst period earnings and consumption. Notice that if a savings
tax is not allowed, the two types can be usefully separated by an earnings tax. The marginal tax on the
earnings of the potentially imitated type is positive if and only if that type saves less for the same earnings.
24
Perhaps the most direct empirical measure relating to this picture would be the will-
ingness to work beyond age 62 being positively correlated with wealth for a given lifetime
average wage level. The model leaves out many features that a¤ect wealth accumulation,
such as random returns on investments, and a proper test would need to recognize the varia-
tion in earnings opportunities at age 62 relative to earlier earnings opportunities. Attempting
to control for these factors would require an empirical study well beyond what would t as
simple, direct support for this key assumption. Instead we look at properties within a single
year as simply measured in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
Before turning to the data, we believe that there are also reasons based on casual empiri-
cism for supporting the appropriateness of using our formulation and expecting a positive
correlation more generally. Modeling savings with rationality and discounting combines un-
derlying preferences and issues of self-control. As discussed in Banks and Diamond (2010),
psychological analyses suggest these are mixed together. We see no reason to think that
this does not apply to working as well as to consuming - whether that is working for later
consumption or working to inuence future work opportunities. That is, working (at a job
with disutility) involves self-control for a future payo¤. And saving involves self-control. So
those with less di¢ culty in self-control may show greater willingness to both work and save,
which would be captured in the standard utility function expression. In a richer model,
human capital investment involves discounting in a similar way to savings decisions and so
may generate the pattern in the standard model structure, although formal modeling would
distinguish between human and nancial capital accumulations.
7.1 Empirical Correlations
We use the SCF panels in 1998, 2001 and 2004, containing information on 13,266 households
in total.13 The tendency to save, in a way perhaps robust over time, is plausibly captured in
whether subjects conrm the statement that they: Save regularly by putting money aside
each month.14 First, we use this proxy to conrm the correlation of saving with potential
for earnings. Of course, circumstances that can a¤ect regular savings behavior vary with
age, on average. So, we do the calculation using separate age cells. As shown in Table 1,
the proportion of regular savers rises steadily with education, taken as a proxy for earnings
potential (skill). The clear pattern supports the positive correlation between higher earnings
potential and saving habits. This is consistent with the empirical evidence reviewed in Banks
and Diamond (2010) and Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2004).
13Population weights are used to convert the SCF sample to a representative national sample.
14The results are similar (with sign reversal) with the statement Dont save - usually spend about as
much as income.
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TABLE 1: Proportion of regular savers
30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59
< High School :21 :16 :26 :25 :28 :27
High School :34 :40 :37 :39 :41 :48
Some College :37 :45 :50 :42 :45 :51
College Degree :58 :54 :51 :57 :57 :50
Graduate Degree :64 :56 :62 :59 :54 :52
Turning to our primary concern, whether for a given skill, those who save more are more
willing to work, we look at the correlation between the savings proxy and earnings within
the age-education cells in Table 2.
TABLE 2: Correlation log(earnings) and saving regularly
30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59
< High School :30 :17 :22 :20 :31 :40
High School :24 :17 :29 :22 :32 :34
Some College :18 :21 :20 :23 :20 :17
College Degree :22 :34 :20 :28 :19 :10
Graduate Degree :30  :01 :17 :15 :15 :13
* denotes statistical signicance at the 5 percent level
Except for one, all of the within-cell correlations in Table 2 are positive and signicant.
The correlation for the full sample between the logarithmic earnings and saving regularly,
conditional on cell dummies, equals :22. The positive correlations are supportive of the
positive correlation which ts with the assumptions in Proposition 1, which applies with
both the discount rate interpretation and the future income interpretation.
The SCF o¤ers a second proxy that relates directly to the model with di¤erent discount
rates. We use the question asking: In planning (your/your familys) saving and spending,
which of the following is most important to [you/you and your (husband/wife/partner)]: the
next few months, the next year, the next few years, the next 5 to 10 years, or longer than 10
years?To interpret the averages, we quantify this variable assigning 0:5; 1; 3; 7:5 and 15 to
the respective answers. Table 3 shows the average time horizon per cell and Table 4 shows
the correlation between time horizon and earnings within cells. Time horizon increases with
education and so wage rate, which is supportive of the assumed positive correlation between
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discount factor and skill used in analysis of the taxation of savings that is not earnings-
varying.
TABLE 3: Average time horizon (converted into years)
30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59
< High School 3:3 3:0 4:5 4:4 4:5 5:3
High School 4:2 4:9 5:5 5:6 5:2 5:5
Some College 4:7 5:9 6:3 5:7 6:0 6:4
College Degree 6:5 7:0 7:3 7:1 7:9 7:5
Graduate Degree 7:4 8:7 8:6 8:4 8:3 8:2
TABLE 4: Correlation log(earnings) and time horizon
30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59
< High School  :00 :12 :11 :19 :22 :29
High School :13 :14 :19 :09 :13 :22
Some College :12 :11 :14 :23 :16 :12
College Degree :17 :37 :20 :29 :29 :22
Graduate Degree :31 :18 :24 :28 :24 :24
* denotes statistical signicance at the 5 percent level.
As with regular savings, those with higher education have longer horizons and within ed-
ucation cells, earnings and time horizon are positively correlated.15 While this is a robust
prediction of the two-period model, in a three-period model with consistent discount rates
within the working years, types with higher discount factors will work relatively more while
they are young but may not when older. In the appendix we look at hours worked per week,
which gives a similar, but less clean answer, reecting the role of uniform hours on many
jobs. We consider again whether one reports to be saving regularly and the reported time
horizon.
Education choices reect both ex ante skilland discount rate and then a¤ect wage rates,
which matter for later taxation. Presumably, the level of completed education is increasing
in both ex ante skill and discount factor, on average. In addition to a¤ecting ex post skill,
education may a¤ect ones discount rate thereafter. Thus education is a proxy for both skill
15Chabris et al. (2008) nd that experimentally measured discount rates have strong predictive power for
eld behavior relative to other variables in their sample (e.g., sex, age, education). However, they nd that
the correlation between the discount rate and each eld behavior is small; none exceeds 0:28 and many are
near 0.
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and discount rate and can not be used in a simple way to distinguish between them. A
further di¢ culty in interpreting the correlations is that education is a discrete variable while
skill is continuous and varying within education classes. In general, there are many factors
that a¤ect savings and work that are not in the basic model used for analysis. Thus, this
evidence is merely suggestive.
8 Conclusion
Design of the taxation of capital income needs to reect many factors. This paper focuses on
heterogeneity in savings rates, an important dimension of heterogeneity for tax setting. The
paper uses a model with jobs, rather than one with individual worker choices of hours, in
order to have diversity in savings behavior at each earnings level in a tractable form. Neither
labor market model describes the nature of opportunities for all workers, leaving room for
learning from both types of models. In an hours model, workers make changes in response
to small changes in marginal taxes. In a jobs model, there are many workers who are not
at the margin of switching to a di¤erent job. Their lack of labor supply response to small
changes in taxes is important for tax policy and seems plausible for many workers.
In keeping with the optimal tax literature the objective function in this paper has been
dened in terms of individual lifetime utilities. Rather than considering how to weight the
utilities of those with di¤erent discount factors (or preference di¤erences more generally), we
have reported some results in terms of di¤erent welfare weights.16 And we have used a model
where the social objective function respects all preferences, not allowing for concerns that
some people save too little for their own good.17 Moving from this analysis toward concrete
policy recommendations calls for addressing these issues, as well as the more complex need
to move from analyses based on lifetimes to ones that incorporate additional concerns that
are relevant for taxes set annually, primarily on annual tax bases.
Appendix: Hours of Work
The results for the correlation between hours worked and the two proxies for the savings
preferences are in Table A1 and Table A2 respectively. The question we use for hours of
16A number of other papers have considered optimal taxes with heterogeneous preferences. See, for
example, Blomquist and Christiansen, 2004, Boadway et al, 2002, Cu¤, 2000, Kaplow, 2008b, Sandmo, 1993,
Tarkiainen and Tuomala, 2007.
17Addressing this concern would include consideration of mandatory retirement income programs and the
e¤ect of the design of savings incentives on consumer behavior, beyond the standard model of lifetime utility
maximization.
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work asks: How many hours (do you/does [he/she]) work on (your/her/his) main job in a
normal week? (if not self-employed) How many hours (do you/does [he/she]) work in this
business in a normal week? (self-employed).18
TABLE A1: Correlation hours worked and saving regularly
30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59
< High School :05  :00 :17 :02 :24 :04
High School :07 :15 :05  :01 :10 :02
Some College  :03 :04 :18 :13 :06  :18
College Degree :11 :10 :05  :03 :10 :14
Graduate Degree :08  :04 :07 :04 :01 :10
* denotes statistical signicance at the 5 percent level
TABLE A2: Correlation hours worked and time horizon
30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59
< High School :23 :22  :07  :15  :01 :08
High School  :02 :05 :07 :03 :19 :08
Some College  :03 :07 :13 :15  :01 :14
College Degree  :01  :01 :04 :11 :07 :05
Graduate Degree :14 :14 :15  :02 :05  :10
* denotes statistical signicance at the 5 percent level
Most of the correlations are positive. Many of them are signicant as well. The correla-
tions for the full-sample using the two di¤erent proxies for saving preference, conditional on
cell dummies, are both :06.
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